THE PATH TO PROFESSIONALISM
Michael P. Ambrosio *
The law is a great and noble profession. The lawyer has
served human kind as healer, helper, leader, defender, mediator,
peacemaker and teacher. As an officer of the court, the lawyer is
the guardian of our system ofjustice and bears special responsibility for improving the law.
Throughout the history of America, lawyers have provided
leadership. Thirty-four of the fifty-five delegates who attended
the constitutional convention in 1787 were members of the legal
profession.' In his book Democracy in America, published in the
nineteenth century, Alex De Tocqueville described lawyers as
America's aristocracy. 2 Celebrated lawyers such as John Marshall, Alexander Hamilton, Daniel Webster, Clarence Darrow,
Reginald Heber Smith, Ralph Nader, and a host of other mostly
anonymous lawyers, devoted their lives to building democratic
institutions, defending liberty in all its forms, and protecting and
advancing the rights of the working class, the poor, and the
unpopular.
The legal profession, however, has been subjected to more
than its share of criticism throughout history, from Plato's "sar* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A., Montclair State
College; J.D., Catholic University. The author delivered the remarks constituting
the essence of this article at Seton Hall Law School's new student orientation. He
would like to thank Mark J. Oberstaedt for his research assistance and Professor
Robert Diab for his editorial help.
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(1987). It should be noted, however, that the eighteenth century definition of "lawyer" referred to anyone who undertook a professional study of law and may not
accurately reflect the number of practicing attorneys among the delegates. Id.
2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 266 (G. Lawrence trans., J.
Mayer ed. 1966). In describing the social status of lawyers in a democratic society,
de Tocqueville remarked:
The people in a democracy do not distrust lawyers, knowing that
it is to their interest to serve the democratic cause; and they listen to
them without getting angry, for they do not imagine them to have any
arrierepensee. In actual fact, the lawyers do not want to overthrow democracy's chosen government, but they do constantly try to guide it
along lines to which it is not inclined by methods foreign to it. By
birth and interest a lawyer is one of the people, but he is an aristocrat
in his habits and tastes; so he is the natural liaison officer between
aristocracy and people, and the link that joins them.
Id. at 487.
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castic attack on professional speech-writers," 3 to Shakespeare's
veiled desire to rid society of lawyers, 4 to the charge of wholesale
incompetence of the bar by the former Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, Warren Burger.5 Unflattering
metaphors for the word "lawyer," such as "hired gun," "mouthpiece," or even worse, "shyster," lend further emphasis to a poor
popular image of the legal profession. Lawyer bashing is popular
sport these days as indicated in a recent survey conducted by the
American Bar Association (ABA) regarding corporate consumers
of lawyers' services. 6 Only six percent of those responding
thought that all or most lawyers deserve to be called professionals.' While public opinion polls indicate that the average American does not have much respect for lawyers in general, almost all
the individuals responding to those same polls indicated that
they had trust and confidence in their personal lawyers.8
The popular image of the American lawyer as portrayed in
the media, movies, and television, even when flattering, unfortunately is often inconsistent with reality. Modem television programs depict the practice of law as glamorous, exciting, and
financially lucrative. Although contemporary law practice can be
all those things it can also be rather dull, tedious and far less
rewarding monetarily than might be expected. Now, more than
ever, the practice of law requires a vast amount of knowledge and
3 PLATO: THE LAWS (T. Saunders trans. 1970). In Athens during Plato's lifetime, individuals conducted their own lawsuits with some assistance from professional speechwriters.
4 W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY IV, PART II IV, ii, 86 (1597-98) ("The first thing we
do, let's kill all the lawyers.").
5 Burger, Remarks, 70 WOMEN LAWYERS JOURNAL 3, (Spr. 1984). In his annual
report to the American Bar Association, the then-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
stressed:
Ten years ago, I first suggested that up to one-third or one-half
of the lawyers coming into our courts were not really qualified to
render fully adequate representation, and that this contributed to the
large cost and the unreasonable time consumed in litigation....
When surveys and studies were made by the Association and
other responsible bodies, it developed that even my estimate of below-standard performance was too low.
Id. at 6. See also Burger, The State ofJustice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 64 (Apr. 1984) (revised
text of Chief Justice Burger's annual report presented to the midyear meeting of
the American.Bar Association on Feb. 12, 1984).
6 In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism,
ABA Comm. on Professionalism 3 (1986).
7 Id. (citing G. Shubert, Survey of Perceptions of the Professionalism of the Bar
(1985) (unpublished survey)). Shubert's study employed a non-random sample of
over 230 judges and corporate executives.
8 Id.
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skill, a capacity for hard work, the ability to function cooperatively with others, and a willingness to make personal sacrifices to
meet professional obligations to clients, the courts, the legal profession, and society. It requires, most of all, a good moral
character.
A former dean of Seton Hall Law School, John Irving, liked
to refer to lawyers as the "guardians of the temple ofjustice" and
"ministers of justice." I think the language in the Preamble to
the Code of Professional Responsibility speaks well of the importance of lawyers in American society and the connection between
lawyers and justice:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society
depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based
upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the
individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened
self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for
only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain
respect and protection. Without it individual rights become
subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed,
and rational self-government is impossible.
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an
understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is
to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.9
Whether law has anything to do with justice or morality is a
question that legal, moral, and political philosophers have addressed from the time of Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century
B.C. up to this very day. In 350 B.C., Aristotle recognized that man
is, by nature, a rational and social being and that what makes a person different from other sentient beings is his or her capacity for
morals.' ° For Aristotle, the polity, or political state, is an ethical
association where shared ideas of morality form the basis for law."
Therefore, law follows from, or is involved with, morality. In other
words, because we have morals, we need law to give it concrete expression. Aristotle's legal theory and others like it are referred to as
9 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (citation
omitted).
10 H. ARKES, FIRST THINGS 34 (1986); see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253a (Aristotle described those who do not have the competency to understand the law as

"either a beast or a god.").
II Id. at 14; see also ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253a ("[Man] alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust; . . . and it is association in [a

common perception] of these things which makes a family and a polis.").
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"natural law" theories. Although there are many widely different
doctrines that go by the name natural law, the term is used here to
mean only a concept of law as a construct of reason and a reflection
of morals.
In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas, who reconciled
Aristotelian thought with Christian thought, defined law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good made by him who has care of
the community, and promulgated."' 2 From this definition, we can
see the natural law perspective that the purpose of law is to achieve
justice and to foster the common good. The common good is variously defined as the general welfare, the public interest, or the collective interest. The concept of the common good, however, is not
simply an abstraction. It is what is concretely and specifically necessary for the good of the community as a whole and the good of the
particular individuals who make up the community.
The connection between law and either justice or morals was
accepted as a given until the nineteenth century and the works of
John Austin and Jeremy Bentham. Austin and Bentham were founders of "legal positivism," a legal philosophy which rejected the
grandiose value-oriented or normative view of law provided in the
natural law theories of Aristotle, Aquinas and others. John Austin,
in a book entitled The Province ofJurisprudenceDetermined, published in
1832, defined law in narrow descriptive terms as simply "a command."'" Austin further recognized that failure to comply with that
command will result in a "sanction" or "punishment."' 4 Positivists
assert that to understand the law and legal systems, one must be
careful to keep separate and distinct the realm of law from the realm
of morals. This separation thesis is the central tenet of legal positivism. In contrast to natural law theories, which focus on justice and
reason, legal positivism puts emphasis on the coercive aspect of law.
Law is thus conceived as an instrument of political power rather
than reasonable regulations for the common good of the
community.
Adherents of both schools of thought, natural law and legal
positivism, have at times tended toward the exaggeration of their
truth and have often misread or read into what earlier thinkers had
written. More recently, however, contemporary legal philosophers
have started to find ways to bridge the seemingly insurmountable
12 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Questions 90-97, art. IV, obj. iii, reprinted in
T. AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 10-11.
13 J.AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 13 (1832).
14 Id. at 15.
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gap between these two categories of legal philosophy. 5 These
scholars have observed that natural law lawyers, who focus on the
point of intersection between law and morals and stress what the law
ought to be, can readily affirm that before one may evaluate the
moral justification for law, it is necessary to understand precisely
what the law is and how it functions in a given legal system. ' 6 These
scholars have further recognized that the positivists, who emphasize
the scientific or empirical study of law, can acknowledge that laws
should be just and should be subjected to careful and continual
moral appraisal. Thus, natural law lawyers and positivists should be
concerned with the moral values reflected in legal rules and
decisions.
Former Supreme Court Justice and legal philosopher Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., claimed by adherents of both natural law and
legal positivism as one of their own, attempted to articulate the
value of the study of legal philosophy orjurisprudence. Upon defining jurisprudence as simply the law in its most generalized part and
noting that the mark of the great lawyer is the ability to apply the
broadest rules, Holmes wrote:
It is through [generalizations] that you not only become a
great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the
universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.'
It is rather surprising that this statement came from the same
Holmes who later described law as " 'a ragbag of details' to be given
order and meaning through the 'highest generalizations,' none of
which was 'worth a damn. .. .' "s To the end of his illustrious career, Holmes remained skeptical and cynical about the meaning of
law and life. Immensely gifted intellectually, widely acclaimed, and
highly productive, he was content to live in accordance with the simple principle that "to live is to function. That is all there is in
living."' 9
15

SeeJ.
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16 Id.
17 Holmes,
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HARV.
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25-29 (1980).

457, 478 (1897) [hereinafter

Holmes, The Path], reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 202
[hereinafter O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS] (1920).
18 D. GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF THE LAW 11 (1988) (citing O.W.
HOLMES, Introduction to the General Survey by European Authors in the Continental Legal
HistoricalSeries, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 301 (1920); see Holmes, The Path, supra
note 17, 476, reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 17, 198;
Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Mr. Justice Holmes (Nov. 22, 1920), reprinted in

2

HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 59 (M. Howe ed. 1961)).
19 Wyzanski, The Democracy ofJustice Holmes, in OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, JR.

WHAT MANNER OF LIBERAL?

70 (D. Burton ed. 1979).
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Holmes, who inspired the legal realist tradition, a variant of
legal positivism, defined law as nothing more than prophesies of
what in fact courts do.2 ° In a law review article, he suggested that
law students can best understand the law if they look at it from the
viewpoint of a bad man. Holmes remarked:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good
one, who finds his reasons for conduct, inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.21
If this passage seems to be suggesting that law students should
learn the law and nothing else, Holmes certainly did not always subscribe to so narrow a view. In The Common Law, he wrote "the life of
the law has not been logic; it has been experience ' 22 and that the
"felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, avowed or unconscious," 2 had a good deal to do with determining "the rules by which men should be governed."' 24 He
understood the history of law as a history of the moral development
of western civilization.2 5 There can be no doubt that Holmes was
concerned with the coherence or rationality of law, as well as its purposes or ends. He wrote:
[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every
rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end
which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring
that end
26
are stated or are ready to be stated in words.
Professor Karl Llewellyn, another very famous realist, had a
similar view of how best to study law. In The Bramble Bush, a book
written for first year law students, he writes:
The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common
sense, to knock your ethics into temporary amnesia. Your
view of social policy, your sense of justice - to knock these
20

Holmes, The Path, supra note 17, 461, reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED
17, 173.
Path, supra note 17, 459, 459, reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COL-

PAPERS, supra note
21 Holmes, The

LECTED PAPERS

supra note 17, 171 171 (emphasis added). See also H.L.

POHLMAN,

15 (1984) (explaining Holmes' "bad-man" theory of law which advocated separating law from
morality to improve legal education).
22 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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23

Id.

24
25

Id.

Holmes, The Path, supra note 17, 459, reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 17, 170.
26 Holmes, The Path, supra note 17, 469 (1897), reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 17, 186.

530

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:524

out of you along with woozy thinking, along with ideas all fuzzed along the edges. You are to acquire ability to think precisely, to analyze coldly, [and] to work within a body of
[material] that is given .... 27
Perhaps Llewellyn recommends lopping off your common sense because you will read many legal decisions and encounter many legal
rules that appear to be, and often are, contrary to a common sense
of what is right and just. He would knock your ethics into temporary amnesia and cast aside your view of social policy and sense of
justice, because he would encourage you to understand precisely
what the law is and not confuse the law with what you think it ought
to be. While he does not equate notions of common sense, ethics,
social policy, or justice with woozy thinking and ideas fuzzed along
the edges, he nonetheless seems to suggest that these notions will
interfere with your ability to think precisely and to analyze coldly, at
least during your first year of law school. It is unfortunate that, for
the most part, the three-year legal education in twentieth century
America has reflected the notion that concern for justice and morality is peripheral, if not irrelevant, to the main business of learning
the law and the analytical skills required to think like a lawyer.
John Finnis, a contemporary natural law philosopher, argues in
Natural Law and Natural Rights that the value-free description and
analysis of law advocated by Llewellyn and so many others is simply
not possible.2" Finnis asserts that reflection on the methods of social science, including jurisprudence, leads to the conclusion that "a
theorist cannot give a theoretical description and analysis of social
facts, unless he also participates in the work of evaluation, of understanding what is really good for human persons, and what is really
required by practical reasonableness. 29 Finnis suggests that the actions, habits, dispositions, practices, and human discourse which
constitute the subject matter of law can be completely understood
only by comprehending their point - that is, their value, their objective, their importance or significance, as conceived by those who
engaged in them. These conceptions of point will be reflected in
the discourse of judges and lawyers, "in the conceptual distinctions
they draw and fail or refuse to draw." 3
Lawyers, no less than judges, must be able to analyze and to
morally appraise the reasons given to support the imposition of
some duties and to justify overriding others. Lawyers must consider
27 K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH
28 J. FINNIs, supra note 15, at 3.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 3-4.

101 (1930).
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whether some duties are absolute or merely primafacie. Moreover,
the role of the advocate requires the lawyer to possess not only the
judge's ability to determine the correct rule, policy, standard, or
principle to be applied to a case, but also the ability to justify a
choice between the competing grounds or values at stake.
It seems that a hard-nosed empirical attitude toward the study
of law, as if the law were just another science like biology or chemistry, misses a major element of the very point and meaning of legal
training. A legal education is not simply vocational training, but
training for a profession. A recent report of the ABA Commission
on Professionalism, after noting that " 'professionalism' is an elastic
concept, the meaning and application of which are hard to pin
down," recalled the definition offered by Dean Roscoe Pound of
Harvard Law School:
The term refers to a group . . .pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service - no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of a liveliart in the spirit of a public service
hood. Pursuit of the learned
31
is the primary purpose.
The training of lawyers to serve the public should not aim at
developing an indifference to the moral, political, and social significance of the ends and consequences of legal decision making. Students should not be encouraged to ignore the way they look at the
world and the moral sense that they have acquired during the course
of a successful life prior to entering law school. Thinking like a lawyer does not mean putting aside your compassion, your understanding, your common sense, or your sense of self to become coldly
logical and analytical, devoid of emotional response to facts, events,
and the persons affected by recognizable wrong. Llewellyn, himself,
noted that "compassion without technique is a mess; and technique
without compassion is a menace. '32 Indeed, it would be a mistake
to conclude that courts do or should apply the law without regard
for fairness or the moral blameworthiness of the conduct of the parties. Students must be taught that every system of law incorporates
the counterbalancing force of equity. Equity is variously defined as
natural justice, discretionary justice, individualized justice, or the infusion of morals into the law. Equity means that which is fair, just,
reasonable, and in accordance with moral standards and the dictates
31

In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprintfor the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism,

ABA Comm. on Professionalism 10 (1986) (quoting R.
ANTIQUrrY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)).
32
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of the human conscience. Equity jurisprudence has served to correct that which is deficient in the law because of its generality.
A lawyer's sense of justice and professional responsibility is the
product of a lifetime of experiences, education and training. I wonder how effectively one can advocate a client's cause without translating that cause in terms of the requirements of fairness and a
justifiable morality. I, for one, define myself and my professional
life in terms of my morality, the fundamental principles of which
include the golden rule, the Kantian imperative to respect every
human being as an end in a kingdom of ends, and the Pauline Principle that one should never do evil to achieve good. I stand within
the natural law tradition which enables me to reconcile my individual and social reality through rational inquiry and religious experience. With the philosopher Ortega y Gasset, I say I am myself and
my experience. I define myself as the sum total of my choices. I
make my conscious choices in accordance with conscientiously held
moral principles and obedience to the law of God as set forth in the
Holy Scriptures.
The ethical relativism and materialism of the modern era that
negates the very concept ofjustice and morality finds ample expression in law schools through the dominating influence of legal positivism. It appears that too much is claimed for the significance of
the separation of law and morals. We should not mistake philosophies or statements which contain some truth as being without error. Rather we must discover when, where, and how they fall short
of being the whole truth. It seems that the natural law lawyer's insistence on the existence of absolute values and objective principles of
justice discoverable through reason has as much claim to truth as
moral skepticism or moral nihilism. Whatever our individual morality or conception of law and justice, we inevitably must live and work
and contend with others who readily reject what we would affirm.
What is most important, however, is that those of us who differ on
fundamental questions, such as the all important moral premises
which guide one's actions, maintain a decent respect for the opinions of others with whom we disagree and remain committed to continuing dialogue. Only by rational discourse can differences be
more clearly understood and perhaps narrowed and points of agreement sought and possibly reached.
Dean Roger Cramton of Cornell Law School argues that when
law schools do not make students' life choices part of their explicit
agenda, the silence and acquiescence conveys a powerful message.
He calls the following the lawyer's ordinary religion that is implicitly
conveyed in law schools:
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Each of you is here (that is, in the world) to get ahead in the
world. You are here (in law school) to get a job that will help
you get ahead in the world. Your job (after law school) is to
help your client get ahead in the world. People can relate to
each other only instrumentally, as objects, in a world that is
characterized by separateness, competition, and scarcity. Justice which is a basic aspiration, is obtained by fair procedures,
by following the rules of the game (not lying, for example) and
by seeking mutually beneficial exchanges. Justice is obtained,
by and large, under present social arrangements; the interaction of individuals seeking to advance themselves produces a
reasonably harmonious and legitimate social order.33
Dean Cramton argues that since law schools do in fact teach values,
they should do it more openly and forthrightly.3 4 Although he
would go far beyond the ordinary religion of law school, he worries
about indoctrination and dogmatism from the podium and the lack
of student and teacher readiness to confidently approach ultimate
questions such as "Who am I?" "What am I doing in this World?"
and "What am I doing in law school?" He notes that in our society
fundamental commitments are viewed as intimate or private, and he
is concerned about classroom revelations of ideas that define the
self. Because of these and other difficulties, issues of love, justice,
or ultimate reality are neglected. 5
One cannot be professionally responsible without being personally responsible. The conversion, or perhaps the transformation, of college graduates into lawyers is a complex and pervasive
process. It includes far more than intellectual development and
skills training. The process of developing professionalism must include changes in personality, values, work habits, and social roles.
Some believe, in contrast, that character is completely formed by the
time students enter law school and not likely to change. While family upbringing is undoubtedly the most dominant factor in the development of a person's values and character, I believe that human
33 Cramton, supra note 32, at 512 (slightly paraphrased quoting of H. Lesnick,
Remarks on Teaching Alternate Dispute Resolution 1-2 (address by Mr. Lesnick, Harvard
Law School (Oct. 9, 1982) (unpublished manuscript)).
34 Id. at 513. Cramton asserts that many law professors find it inappropriate or
troublesome to discuss moral questions in the classroom or in their writing. Id. at
512. He feels that the difficulty arises in the controversial nature of the questions
themselves which often cause both the professor and student to feel uneasy and
embarrassed. Id. at 512-13. The unfortunate result of this dilemma is that by failing
to struggle for effective answers, the questions become answered by ignoring them.
Id. at 513. As Cramton resolves, -[t]here is (to borrow from Sartre), quite literally,
.no exit.'" Id.
35 Id.

534

SETON HALL IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:524

beings are free to be what they choose to be and that every person
can change and grow to a higher level of awareness and being.
Although it may not be possible to have a precise definition of
what constitutes the traits of a good moral character, I think we
know it when we see it. It is no easy task for law schools to influence
the character development of their students. Just because a task is
difficult and complex, however, does not mean that it should not be
attempted. In view of the fact that a good moral character is a universal requirement for admission to the bar,3 6 law schools would be
remiss if they did not attempt to address the question of whether or
not virtue can or must be taught.
We, the teachers, must be humble enough to admit that
whatever knowledge of the truth we may have acquired, it is far
short of the whole truth. If the law school experience is designed to
ready students for the rigors of the profession, some effort must be
made to provide them with the opportunity for self appraisal and,
when necessary, self transformation. We must, therefore, remain
committed to dialogue among ourselves and with our students and
others outside the law school. The demands of a lawyer's life and
the professional obligations imposed by the Rules of Professional
Conduct cannot be met without the virtues of honesty, truthfulness,
trustworthiness, and justice.
Can the character trait of responsibility be taught? I believe so.
One can acquire responsibility by developing the habit of being responsible. The term responsibility encompasses both the general
and formal requirements of justifying action. The demand for
moral justification emerges when there is some reason for thinking
that an act is wrong. An individual is answerable for an act that violates some moral principle or rule, and he or she is expected to offer
36 See Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). In Baird, the Supreme
Court, per Justice Black, held that moral character is one of the primary qualifications for admission to the Bar. Id. at 8. But Justice Black termed the notion of
"good moral character" as "unusually ambigous ... [and] can be defined in an
almost unlimited number of ways . . . [to] reflect the attitudes, experiences and
prejudices of the definer." Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239
(1957).
In a dissenting opinion in Baird,Justice Blackmun stated:
The bar has not enjoyed prerogatives; it has been entrusted with anxious possibilities .... From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a
high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance
of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, even
compendiously described as "moral character."
Baird, 401 U.S. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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reasons in justification for the act. I believe that lawyers who are
trained only to know what the law is and who have neither the training nor interest to explore the reasons underlying legal rules are
unlikely to have the disposition or the ability to make moral appraisals, to engage in a moral discourse about existing law, or to perform
satisfactorily their professional obligations. What, if anything, the
law has to do with the pursuit of justice is a question that perhaps
each of us in the profession must answer for ourselves. If legal education is to be in the best interests of both law students and the
public, however, it must attempt to teach at least those virtues at the
core of professional responsibility and to explore the relationship
between law and justice.
Probably no single event has done more to influence the development of the ethical standards of the legal profession than the
scandal commonly referred to as "Watergate," in which a host of
lawyers at the top rank of the profession were found to have violated
the law and their professional obligations in the administration of a
President and Vice President who were themselves lawyers.3 7 The
threatened impeachment of a United States president and the disbarment of a cadre of lawyers who were his closest advisors sent
shock waves throughout the American legal profession. Many
pointed to the profession's Code of Ethics as a source of the problem. Ironically, only a few years before the Watergate scandal, the
ABA had adopted in 1969 the Code of Professional Responsibility
to replace the 1908 Canons of Ethics.
In 1977, an ABA Commission was formed to evaluate the Code
of Professional Responsibility as a standard of ethics for the legal
profession. The Kutak Commission, named after its chairman Robert Kutak, decided that the Code was in need of so much amendment that it was easier to formulate an entirely new set of standards.
After two and one-half years, the Kutak Commission produced a
Discussion Draft of the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 38
The new Model Rules were the subject of debate throughout the
following three years until a much watered-down version was
adopted by the ABA in 1983. I served as the Reporter and Vice
37 See generally THE BREAKING OF A PRESIDENT: THE NIXON CONNECTION (M.
Miller ed. 1975) (chronicling Watergate events which lead to the ultimate downfall
of President Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell and others).
38 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, i (Discussion Draft 1980). The Draft
was developed after two and one-half years of study which centered on dialogue
with academicians and attorneys representing a wide area of practice, written commentary from organizations and individuals, and current events, particularly the
1970's evolution of ethical thought. Id. at ii.
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Chair of the New Jersey Bar Association committee charged to evaluate the Model Rules. That Committee recommended to the New
Jersey Supreme Court that it adopt the stricter standards set forth in
the Discussion Draft. 39 Eventually the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted, with significant amendments, the ABA Model Rules as the
disciplinary standard for New Jersey lawyers.4 ° New Jersey was not
only the first state to adopt the Model Rules, but by virtue of the
amendments to the final ABA version, it put into place the strictest
ethical standards of any state in the United States.
Two very different conceptions of the lawyer's role in the adversary system of justice were given some expression in the original
discussion draft of the Model Rules. The standard conception of
the lawyer is that of pure legal advocate. There are two principles
upon which this standard is based: partisanship and moral neutrality. 4 The principle of partisanship is that the lawyer shall seek to
obtain the wants or objectives of the client and use whatever lawful
means are available in the pursuit of client interests. The principle
of moral neutrality is that the lawyer is neither responsible nor morally accountable for any injustice brought about in pursuit of client
interests. In other words, it is not the job of the lawyer to consider
whether the client's objectives are ethical or morally justifiable. The
lawyer has a professional obligation to subordinate his or her personal morals when acting on behalf of a client. The classic statement of the unyielding partisanship of the advocate is that of Lord
Brougham, an English Barrister, who in his 1821 defense of Queen
Caroline's divorce case before the House of Lords said:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save his
client by all means and expedients, and at all costs to other
persons, and among them, himself, is his first and only duty:
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he
must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.4 2
39 Sup. Ct. Comm 'n Rept. on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, N.J. LAw J. 2
(Supp. July 28, 1983).
40 N.J. Ct. R. 1:14. The Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended and supplemented, were adopted on July 12, 1984, and replaced the Disciplinary Rules of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which had been in effect since 1971 and
amended in 1975.
41
42
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An alternative conception of the lawyer's role is that of moral
activist or moral agent. The lawyer, as moral agent, is responsible
for client ends as well as the means to achieve those ends.4" The
practice of law is, in essence, a moral encounter in which the lawyer
engages in a dialogue or moral discourse with the client about
whether what the client wants is morally justifiable as well as legally
permissible.4 4 Of course, the lawyer must be open to the possibility
that his perception ofjustice or morality may not be as enlightened
as that of the client and, further, the lawyer must attempt to provide
the client with what the client needs rather than simply what the
client wants. The lawyer should raise with the client all moral, economic, social, and political considerations and not limit his advice
and counsel to strictly legal considerations. Lawyers are exhorted to
draw upon their sense of morals and wisdom in advising clients in
Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. Model Rule 2.1 of the 1983 ABA Model Rules expressly permits lawyers to take this broader view of their role.4 5
Different philosophies or perspectives of the nature and function of law are more or less compatible with and, perhaps, even lead
to different conceptions of the lawyers role in our adversary system.
The natural law perspective of law as value laden and as the means
to achieve justice would seem to encompass the notion that the lawyer is a moral agent who bears responsibility for the objectives or
ends of prospective clients. Conversely, the separation of law and
morals that is the central tenet of legal positivism would seem to
justify the moral neutrality and partisan loyalty of the pure legal advocate. Pure advocacy may have a legitimate place within the context of the defense of those accused of a crime or, possibly, in the
context of civil litigation. It would seem, however, to have no place
where the lawyer acts as advisor, counselor or public servant or in
some other role removed from a litigation context.
43 Id. at 167.
44 T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 21-22 (1934). Shaffer
found that such a "moral discourse," as opposed to an "adversary discourse," not
only reconciled the client with the lawyer but also with the community as a whole.
Id. at 127. Finding the moral discourse to be grounded in the "person of the client," Shaffer argues that it is better to work toward serving the person, rather than
the client's interests. Id. at 132-33.
45 Rule 2.1 defines the lawyer's role as an "Advisor" as follows:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to the law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that my be relevant to
the client's situation.
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2.1 (1989).
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The seeming dichotomy between the lawyer as pure legal advocate and the lawyer as moral activist may be more apparant than
real. Because lawyers act in roles other than advocate and are not
required to accept any and all cases offered them, there is ample
scope for the exercise of discretion and independent moral critique
of the objectives of their clients and prospective clients. Lawyers
who adopt the responsibility of moral agency can, nevertheless, accept the fact that many legal disputes involve no moral questions
and that the standard conception of the lawyer as pure legal advocate is appropriate for much of what lawyers do. In those instances
where the applicable law (including the law regulating lawyers) is
unclear or morally suspect, a lawyer is free to challenge the prevailing legal rules. To challenge and provide reasons for change of existing law, however, the lawyer must be informed by sources beyond
the law. The Preamble to the 1983 ABA Model Rules aptly recognizes the limits of legal rules as a guide to lawyers' conduct and to
conduct in general. In words that capture the essence of Lon
Fuller's distinction between a morality of duty and a morality of aspiration the Preamble states:
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society,
depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public
opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement
through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however,
exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a
framework for the ethical practice of law. 4 6
To anyone who accepts that lawyers need to be sensitized to the
moral implications of their conduct and encouraged and trained to
engage in moral discourse, it should be apparent that moral philosophy bears as much relevance to the study and practice of law as
legal philosophy. Indeed, legal philosophy grew out of moral
philosophy.
I want to conclude with a comment from Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., who ended his remarks on the profession of law as
follows:
And now, perhaps, I ought to have done. But I know that
some spirit of fire will feel that his main question has not been
answered. He will ask, What is all this to my soul? You do not
bid me sell my birth-right for a mess of pottage; what have you
46 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Preamble (1983).
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said to show that I can reach my own spiritual possibilities
through such a door as this? How can the laborious study of a
dry and technical system, the greedy watch for clients and
practice of shopkeepers' arts, the mannerless
conflicts over
47
often sordid interests, make out a life?
Let me remind you that this is the same Holmes that exhorted us to
connect our subject to the universe, to catch an echo of the infinite,
a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law. In
an address to law students; Holmes posited that "the law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history
of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, in spite of
48
popular jests, tends to make good citizens and good men."
Though the ranks of lawyers are increasing, for most of you becoming a lawyer will provide you a fuller life. I challenge you today
to guard against the affliction that lawyers all too often fall prey to,
one that infected as great a lawyer as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.: the
disease of cynicism. If you view the law as a calling and a vocation
rather than as simply a trade or a means to obtain wealth, power,
and social status, you can live greatly in the law. As a lawyer you will
have ample opportunity to give expression to your deepest convictions of what is good and right as well as your sense of faith, hope
and love. As you immerse yourself in the role of law student or
lawyer take care to find yourself. If you seek to express the best that
is in you as you assume these roles, I promise, you will surely become a richer, fuller, more complete person.
It seems to me that the best thing you can do for your career is
to hold on to that part of yourself that is authentic and good and
strive to rid yourself of those traits of character that impede your
full flourishing as a person. If law school is to change you, and it
surely will, let it change you for the better. Strive to generate an
ever-increasing understanding of and a passion for justice, improve
your ability to engage in moral discourse, be tolerant of the opinions of others, always maintain a capacity for self-criticism, and an
openness to emotional, intellectual, spiritual and professional
growth.
47 E. DWORKIN, J. HIMMELSTEIN & H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER 47 (1981)
(quoting 0. W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law (lecture delivered to undergraduates
of Harvard University on Feb. 17, 1886)).
48 Holmes, The Path, supra note 17, 459, reprintedin O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED
PAPERS, Supra note 17, 170.

